

THREE PAGES 9/11
FAA Terrorist Warning



US Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

Civil Aviation Security

Security Directive

Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should Be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to Air Carriers

Number: SD 108-98-05

Date: December 8, 1998

EXPIRATION: January 31, 1999

Security Directive (SD) 108-98-05 must be implemented immediately upon receipt.

AVSEC ALERT LEVEL: AVSEC Alert Level III remains in effect.

INFORMATION:

We have received information that unidentified individuals, who are associated with a terrorist organization, may be planning a hijacking from a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States. We believe the threat is current.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UNDER 14 CFR PART 108:

1. In addition to the measures required by this SD, all measures required under other SD's or under the air carrier standard security program (ACSSP) remain in effect. Other SD series applicable to the air carrier operations affected by SD 108-98-05 are: SD 95-02 series; SD 96-03 series; SD 97-01 series; and the SD 108-98-01 series.
 2. The measures outlined in this SD shall be applied to each scheduled and public charter flight or flight segment departing from the following airports:
 - John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)
 - La Guardia Airport (LGA)
 - Newark International Airport (EWR)
- I. Within 48 hours after receiving this SD, the air carrier must submit to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) for approval, a plan to increase air carrier oversight that addresses proper screening and clearance procedures at screening checkpoints. At multiple-use checkpoints, a cooperative plan for increasing presence at the checkpoints may be developed jointly by air carriers using that checkpoint. Plans should address increasing the presence of Ground Security Coordinators (GSC's), increasing the use of Checkpoint Security Supervisors (CSS's), and other actions to improve oversight of checkpoint operations.
 - II. Recent surveillance of procedures used to screen passengers and their carry-on items has revealed that particular attention to the following areas is required.
 - A. Metal detector alarms. Screeners must not assume that the cause of the alarm is common clothing items such as the belt buckle, metal buttons on clothing, and metal in shoes. The screeners must determine that there isn't another item (a weapon) causing the alarm.

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B. Screening persons in wheelchairs and the wheelchair itself.

[Redacted]

The guidelines for screening of handicapped persons, as outlined in the checkpoint operations guide (COG), should be closely followed.

C. Manual searches of carry-on items. Screeners must not assume the source of the suspect object, and must continue searching all other articles in the carry-on item.

D. Clearance procedures using an explosive trace detector (ETD) device for suspect items identified by the x-ray operator (see section I. of the SD 97-01 series). Suspect items must be individually cleared with the ETD device using the procedures outlined in the FAA-approved amendment. All other articles in the carry-on item must be manually searched (see sections C.1.b. and C.1.b.1. of the FAA-approved ETD device amendment).

III.

[Redacted]

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IV. A GSC must oversee the inspection of a sterile area each time it is put into operation following a period of non-control. The inspection must ensure that the sterile area is clear of unauthorized persons, explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous items (see ACSSP section IV.B.2.).

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VI. The following measures supersede the checkpoint staffing standards outlined in ACSSP section II. Screeners must only perform the duties of the specific screening position they are assigned to.

- A. X-ray operators must only interpret images on the monitor, and must refer suspect items to another screener for additional screening.
- B. Persons performing manual searches of carry-on items must only perform those searches.
- C. Persons monitoring the walk-through metal detector must only perform that duty.
- D. Persons performing hand-held metal detector screening or pat down searches of persons must only perform that duty.
- E. ETD device operators must only be assigned to conduct screening of carry-on items, and associated clearance procedures (manual searches) of carry-on items screened, using an ETD device.

VII. The following measures apply to each air carrier who has an established exclusive area agreement with the airport operator.

A. Review and test contingency and emergency communications procedures to ensure that those systems are operational.


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VIII. Air carriers shall advise direct air carrier employees and representatives contracted by the air carrier, that security procedures must be applied in a courteous and non-discriminatory manner. The advisory must emphasize that it is impermissible to apply any procedures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or gender characteristics, or national origin of US citizens.

AIR CARRIER ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Within 24 hours of receipt of this SD, the air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, acknowledging receipt.

AIR CARRIER DISSEMINATION REQUIRED: The air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information in this SD, to ensure full implementation by the effective time and date.

The air carriers shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at JFK, LGA, and EWR only. US air carrier local station security personnel should coordinate the information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know.

The air carriers must brief all air carrier personnel performing security duties to implement this SD on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination. No other dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. Unauthorized dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 14 CFR 108.18 and 191.5.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, according to 14 CFR 108.18(c), air carriers may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations.

FOR FAA ACTION ONLY: The FAA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security element of all affected US air carriers operating at JFK, LGA, and EWR only.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post must refer to STATE 093752, 300308Z Mar 93, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

/s/

Cathal L. Flynn
Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security

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US Department
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Civil Aviation Security
Security Directive

Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to U.S. Air Carriers

Number: SD 108-00-03B

Date: July 27, 2001

EXPIRATION: January 31, 2002

Security Directive (SD) 108-00-03B, which shall be implemented immediately upon receipt, extends for an additional six months the security measures and actions required under SD 108-00-03A, dated February 15, 2001, which it supercedes. Substantive changes from SD 108-00-03A are indicated by bold text.

INFORMATION: FAA is not aware of any information that moderates the credibility of the threat identified in SD 108-00-03 and, therefore, republishes the threat information in its entirety, as follows:

Information has been received that a mentally distraught Egyptian national has made threats to blow up an aircraft and/or harm U.S. officials. The threat to blow up an aircraft may involve the individual carrying explosives aboard an airliner. The threat to harm U.S. officials may involve the mailing of a package, parcel, or letter to the United States.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS:

- I. Measures outlined in this SD shall be immediately implemented by all U.S. air carriers operating from Cairo, Egypt, to the United States, its territories and Commonwealths.
- II. Should an individual matching the name and description and/or carrying a passport noted in Section III present himself for transport, the air carrier shall:
 - A. Not transport that individual or his baggage [REDACTED]
 - B. Immediately notify appropriate local law enforcement authorities and provide them with the information in this directive.
 - C. Immediately notify all U.S. air carriers at that airport.
 - D. Immediately notify the FAA 24-hour watch at (202) 267-3099.
- III. The following individual is considered to be dangerous:
 - A. [name] [name]

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Also:

- [name] [name] [name] [name]

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Date and Place of Birth (DPOB): [REDACTED]
Hair: [REDACTED]
Eyes: [REDACTED]
Height: [REDACTED]
Weight: [REDACTED]
Nationality: Egyptian
Passport: [REDACTED]

IV. The air carrier shall strictly enforce the cargo acceptance procedures required by the ACSSP Section XV.A.8.

AIR CARRIER ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that they have received it.

AIR CARRIER DISSEMINATION REQUIRED: The air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information in this SD.

The air carriers shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at foreign locations only. U.S. air carrier local station security personnel should coordinate the information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All air carrier personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the air carrier on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: In accordance with ACSSP Section XV.A.2., the air carrier shall immediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by the carrier or its agents, or is not being carried out by a foreign government authority charged with performing security procedures.

FOR FAA ACTION ONLY: The FAA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. air carriers.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post must refer to STATE 174137, 212201Z Aug 96, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

//S//

Michael A. Canavan
Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security

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US Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

Civil Aviation Security

Security Directive
Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to Air Carriers

Number: SD-96-05

Date: August 19, 1996

EXPIRATION: January 25, 1997

FAA COMMENTS: Air Carriers will continue to be at AVSEC Alert Level III. This Security Directive (SD) provides information regarding U.S. judicial proceedings, the threat to U.S. air carriers following the crash of TWA flight 800, new information regarding the conviction and planned sentencing of terrorist involved in the hijacking of an EgyptAir airliner in 1985, and:

- cancels SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D,
- consolidates information that was contained in SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D,
- combines SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D profiles into one closely following SD-96-02D,
- [REDACTED]
- continues the SD-96-02D revocation of off-airport and curbside check-in amendments for all flights specified in Section II of this SD.
- provides three attachments: [REDACTED]

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INFORMATION:

Anti-U.S. sentiment has been evident during 1996 in response to U.S. judicial proceedings. These judicial proceedings involve individuals with known or alleged ties to transnational terrorist organizations and could prompt violent acts against U.S. interests by terrorist organizations or persons affiliated with or sympathetic to individuals on trial or already sentenced.

The January 1996 conviction and sentence of Egyptian cleric Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman to life without the possibility of parole or extradition is bitterly resented by his followers. Threats have been made against the United States by these elements, who charge that the United States is unduly attacking their


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Islamic leaders and teachings. These sentiments were again echoed by Sheik Rahman at his sentencing. He verbally attacked the United States, President Clinton, the Congress, the Pentagon and the court, calling them "infidels," and characterized the United States as Islam's greatest enemy.

The investigation into the crash of TWA flight 800 is ongoing. It should be noted that there is no information linking any of the aforementioned events with the TWA crash. The cause of the TWA crash has not been determined, and it is difficult to ascertain when investigators will be able to make a determination as to the cause.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY U.S. CARRIERS:

- L The following measures shall be applied to all flights (regardless of destination) departing locations within the United States and its territories/commonwealths:
 - A. The following profile shall be conducted at the initial point where the passenger checks in. (see Attachment 1)
 - 1. A passenger [except for those identified in NOTE 1, below] becomes a selectee if



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B. All passengers shall be asked the following questions. If the passenger answers "yes" to either of the questions, the suspect items identified shall be cleared in accordance with Section LD below .

1. "Has anyone unknown to you asked you to carry an item on this flight?"
2. "Have any of the items you are traveling with been out of your immediate control since the time you packed them?"

If a passenger declares that they have left their baggage with anyone other than an air carrier representative, those bags must be inspected by the passenger to determine if anything has been added to the contents without their knowledge. The passenger inspection must be conducted under the direct supervision of an air carrier representative.

C. Require that any passenger checking baggage appearing to be 18 years of age or older, present an official photo identification medium issued by a government authority, or two other forms of identification at least one of which must be issued by a government authority. The air carrier representative must reconcile the passenger identification with the name on the passenger's ticket. [See NOTE 3, below]

If the passenger cannot produce the required identification [REDACTED] the passenger becomes a selectee and shall be cleared in accordance with Section LD. below [See NOTE 4, below].

[NOTE 3: A Federal law enforcement officer [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]

[NOTE 4: This is not intended to include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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D. All checked and carry-on baggage of selectees or suspect items of passengers on intracontinental U.S. flights, shall be subjected to either LD.1., 2., 3., or 4. below. All checked and carry-on baggage of selectees or suspect items of passengers on international flights departing the U.S., flights departing the U.S. to Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or a U.S. territory and flights departing Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or a U.S. territory shall be subjected to either LD.1., 2., or 3. below. (see Attachment 3)

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1. Empty the baggage/item and physically search its contents with a qualified screener. [REDACTED] shall be subjected to a two-plane x-ray; or
2. Screen the baggage/item using an FAA certified Explosives Detection System (EDS) [see NOTE 5, below]; or
3. Open and examine the baggage/item using an explosives trace detection device (i.e., an explosives vapor and/or particle detection device) that has been assessed by the FAA as effective [see NOTE 5, below]; or
4. Ensure the baggage/item is not transported on the aircraft without the passenger.


[NOTE 5: EDS equipment must be operated and maintained in accordance with the protocols and procedures established in the air carrier's approved security program amendment for the site. A list of trace detection devices which have been assessed as effective by the FAA, and the procedures for use, will be provided by the PSI.]

- E. Warn all passengers at check-in to control their carry-on baggage to prevent introduction of dangerous items without their knowledge. Passengers will also be admonished not to accept items from unknown persons.
- F. Notify all passengers that checked and carry-on baggage is subject to search.
- G. Ground Security Coordinators (GSC's) shall immediately notify Airport Security Coordinators (ASC's) or designees of suspicious items or activities at the airport.

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H. Where exclusive area agreements exist, the air carrier in coordination with the airport operator, will conduct random identification checks in those portions of the exclusive area that fall within the secured area.

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II. The following measures shall be applied to all flights departing:

- the U.S. to all international locations [redacted]
- the continental U.S. to Hawaii, Puerto Rico and all U.S. territories;
- Hawaii, Puerto Rico and all U.S. territories to the continental U.S. or any international location.

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A. The GSC/ISC communication as required by ACSSP Section XIII H.1., must be accomplished by completing a written declaration.

1. The written declaration shall state the following:

"All security issues/concerns for Flight # _____ have been resolved and communicated to the Inflight Security Coordinator (ISC)."

2. This declaration must include the signature of the GSC and acknowledged by a signature of the ISC. The declaration must be maintained at the station of departure for 14 days after the departure of the flight.

B. Apply a positive passenger/checked baggage match in accordance with ACSSP Section XV.A.3. [This SD supersedes the bag match required by ACSSP Section VIII.B.]

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III. The following measures shall be implemented at all [redacted] airports:

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A. Continually conduct physical searches of carry-on items at each x-ray unit in operation during the time passenger and baggage screening is being conducted, so that a physical search is on-going at each x-ray unit at all times. The primary items to be physically searched shall be selected by the x-ray operator. When physical search as requested by an x-ray operator is not being conducted, the CSS/SIC will ensure a continuation of physical searches on bags selected at random.

B. On a daily basis, each air carrier shall observe each screening checkpoint used by that air carrier to process passengers; to ensure proper implementation of the ACSSP and

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applicable SD's. This period of observation, which shall be no less than 20 minutes, must be performed by air carrier management personnel or a fully qualified GSC who is a direct employee of the air carrier. The time spent at the checkpoint must be noted in the daily activity log maintained at each checkpoint. [See NOTE 6, below.]

[NOTE 6: The period of observation must be performed a minimum of once every 8 hours during periods of checkpoint operation. One air carrier may not perform this function for other air carriers. However, an air carrier may use a direct employee of another air carrier when the air carrier subject to this measure does not have a permanent employee at that airport. At multiple use checkpoints, it is recommended that all air carriers work together to develop a rotation schedule so that checkpoints are being visited/observed routinely during all hours of operation.]

IV. The following measures shall be applied at the last U.S. point of departure to all aircraft destined for an international location and all aircraft arriving in the U.S. from an international location

[REDACTED]

A. [REDACTED] the entire passenger cabin, and cockpit areas of each aircraft shall be searched [REDACTED]. The search must include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Personnel conducting the search must be familiar with the aircraft.

B. [REDACTED] the air carrier shall ensure that personnel familiar with the aircraft inspect areas of the aircraft [REDACTED]

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V. The following measure shall be applied to each aircraft at the origination point of any flight destined for an international location [REDACTED]

A. [REDACTED] the cargo hold area of the aircraft shall be searched by personnel familiar with that aircraft [REDACTED]

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES:

With respect to the provisions of this SD, according to FAR 108.18(c), air carriers may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations.

AIR CARRIER DISSEMINATION REQUIRED:

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Within 24 hours of receipt of this Directive, the air carrier shall provide written confirmation to the PSI that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information in the Directive to ensure full implementation.

The air carriers shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at domestic locations only. U.S. air carrier local station security personnel should coordinate the information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know.


All air carrier personnel performing security duties implementing this SD must be briefed by the air carrier on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination. No other dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. Unauthorized dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 14 CFR 108.18.

FOR FAA ACTION ONLY: DISSEMINATION

The FAA shall issue this Directive immediately to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. air carriers.


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Attachment 1



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Attachment 2




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Attachment 3



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FAA Hearing/Briefing Activity Prior to September 11, 2001:

March 10, 1999 - House Appropriation Transportation and Related Agencies Subcommittee - Executive Session - Aviation Security; Purchase of EDS Equipment.

March 22, 2000 - House Appropriation Transportation and Related Agencies Subcommittee - Executive Session - Aviation Security; Screening of Passengers, Bags. EDS Equipment.

April 6, 2000 - Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee - Aviation Security.

November-December 2000 - Series of discussions with House Transportation and Related Agencies Subcommittee staff on EDS/L-3 issues.

March 20, 2001 - The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security provided a classified briefing to the Chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, Representative John Mica, on a variety of aviation security issues, including current threat assessment against US air carriers.

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THIS STORY HAS BEEN FORMATTED FOR EASY PRINTING

The Boston Globe**BULLETINS WARNED AIRPORTS IN '98****Author(s):** Ralph Ranalli, Globe Staff **Date:** May 26, 2002 **Page:** A1 **Section:** National/Foreign

The Federal Aviation Administration warned the nation's airports and airlines in late 1998 about a possible terrorist hijacking "at a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States" and urged a "high degree of vigilance" against threats to US civil aviation from Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, according to classified security bulletins obtained by the Globe.

The three FAA information circulars - issued nearly three years before the Sept. 11 attacks - raise new questions about how much specific information US intelligence and regulatory agencies had about threats to US aircraft from bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. Despite the gap in time between the 1998 warnings and the 2001 attack, the memos indicate ongoing concern about Al Qaeda's intentions. Bush administration and FAA officials have characterized pre-Sept. 11 intelligence warnings as too broad to defend against and said they lacked a "credible" hijacking threat.

A congressional committee is probing what the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies knew and whether they could have pieced information together in time to stop the worst terrorist incidents in US history.

The Bush administration has been on the defensive since revelations earlier this month that the president was warned of a terrorist hijacking threat during a briefing a month before Sept. 11. The FBI has also been criticized for apparently ignoring an urgent memo written four months before the attacks by an agent in Phoenix, warning about men with connections to bin Laden training at US flight schools.

On Friday, FBI Director Robert Mueller III said he had ordered an inquiry into a Minneapolis FBI agent's accusations that officials at FBI headquarters in Washington had repeatedly held back local agents in Minnesota who wanted to investigate alleged terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui's attempts to receive jet flight training. After the attacks, federal prosecutors referred to Moussaoui as the "20th hijacker" from Sept. 11 and indicted him on six counts in connection with the strikes.

At a press briefing two weeks ago President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said the government's intelligence data before Sept. 11 were "very generalized" and too focused on US targets abroad for officials to decide how to respond. The FAA released a summary last week of 15 similar information circulars issued between Jan. 1 and Sept. 11, 2001, purporting to show that federal officials did not have specific information about a hijacking threat or a plan to use commercial aircraft as weapons.

Scott Brenner, FAA assistant administrator for public affairs, said the agency had been tracking a possible threat from bin Laden and Al Qaeda since 1998, but said the agency "never had a credible hijacking threat."

The documents obtained by the Globe, however, appear to show that US intelligence agencies communicated to the FAA specific concerns about threats, including hijackings, to domestic airliners dating back to the Clinton administration.

FAA officials refused to talk about what information prompted the agency to warn airports and airlines, but one acknowledged privately that a warning involving a "metropolitan airport" in the Eastern United States effectively applied to fewer than 20 airfields.

"We can't go into more specifics," Brenner said. "We get this from the intelligence community. This is all classified information."

Brian Sierra, spokesman for the Justice Department in Washington, said that FBI and other intelligence agencies routinely give information to the FAA, but declined to comment on the specifics of the 1998 circulars. FBI spokeswoman Debbie Weierman also refused comment, saying that the Sept. 11 attacks "are still a pending investigation."

The 1998 FAA circulars given to the Globe warn airport and airline officials about possible hijackings by Osama bin

Laden's terrorist network.

The first of the three circulars, issued on Oct. 8, instructs airports and airlines to maintain a "high degree of alertness" based on statements made by bin Laden and other Islamic leaders and intelligence information following US cruise missile attacks against suspected Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. The August 1998 missile attacks followed the terrorist bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Bin Laden, the circular states, had praised one of the bombers arrested in a failed 1995 plot to blow up US civilian airlines in the Far East and another Islamic leader had stated that "militants had been mobilized to strike a significant US or Israeli target, to include bringing down or hijacking aircraft."

"While this threat remains unsubstantiated, there is information from one of the incarcerated suspects in the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi that he received aircraft hijack training," the document states.

"The arrest and pending extradition of bin Laden cadre raises the possibility of a US airliner being hijacked in an effort to demand the release of incarcerated members."

Exactly two months later, the FAA released another information circular, which warned of a threat against an Eastern US airport.

"The FAA has received information that unidentified individuals, who are associated with a terrorist organization, may be planning a hijacking at a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States," the circular states.

Under the "FAA Comment" section, the circular further states: "The FAA cannot at this time refute this threat to civil aviation. We believe the threat is current."

Although the Dec. 8 circular is the only one of the three that does not specifically mention bin Laden and his terrorist organization, it does appear to refer to the previous circular, citing "the potential for retaliation for US cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan."

Because of those strikes, as well as "a general increase in tensions in the Middle East," the document states that the FAA "strongly recommends a high degree of vigilance."

The third bulletin, issued three weeks later, warned airlines and airports to "remain vigilant" owing to statements made by bin Laden after the cruise missile attacks.

In an ABC News interview earlier in 1998, bin Laden said that "every American should be a target for Muslims," and that it was "the duty of Muslims to confront, fight, and kill British and American citizens."

"In light of these inflammatory statements there is continuing concern that bin Laden and terrorist groups comprising his terrorist network are preparing to conduct further terrorist attacks against US interests, including US civil aviation," the Dec. 29 bulletin states.

FAA information circulars are given to airline and airport security officials, but are classified and cannot be disseminated under penalty of federal law - a point stressed by several officials queried by the Globe about the 1998 documents last week. Intended as warnings, they are considered less serious than FAA "security directives" and "emergency amendments," which both inform officials of a threat and instruct them to take specific action to counter it.

Massport Acting director Thomas Kinton declined to comment on the 1998 FAA warnings, saying only that "information is constantly flowing" in the form of circulars and other documents.

Another high-ranking Massport official, however, said FAA information circulars routinely prompted word to go out to the 80 State Police officers and other security personnel at the airport to be extra vigilant, and sometimes officials restrict access past security checkpoints to ticketed travelers and ban curbside parking.

"The information circulars mattered, but the critical thing was whether the FAA followed up with an order to do something specific," the official said.

It was unclear whether the warnings were ever forwarded to the three major private security companies hired by the

airlines to conduct passenger screening.

Officials at Argenbright Security in Atlanta and Huntleigh Corp. in St. Louis did not return telephone calls seeking comment, but a representative of Irving, Texas-based Globe Aviation Services, speaking on condition of anonymity, said last week that a check of the company's files turned up no evidence that the company had received the 1998 circulars.

According to last week's FAA summary, the 2001 circulars warn of the possibility of danger to US aircraft and citizens overseas due to general tensions in the Middle East, described a plot to bomb a baggage claim area at Los Angeles International Airport, warned about new techniques for smuggling weapons aboard aircraft and how one particular unnamed "weapons system" might be used against US aircraft, and alerted airlines about recent bombings in Spain by the Basque separatist group ETA.

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SIDEBAR:

THE PAPER TRAIL

**INFORMATION CIRCULARS ISSUED BY THE FAA INDICATE CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE AL QAEDA HIJACKINGS DATED BACK AT LEAST TO LATE 1998.
PLEASE REFER TO MICROFILM FOR CHART DATA.**

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