FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MARCH
23-24, 1999 - National Transportation Safety Board Meeting
The
cornerstone of the safety goals for the NATIONAL AIR DISASTER ALLIANCE
& FOUNDATION is that the FAA should implement 100% of the Safety
Board fatal air crash-derived recommendations.
The
FAA presently implements only 82.5%. There are 43 safety
recommendations in an "OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE" response, and
some of the items most needed involve Boeing 737's.
The
Alliance represents survivors and those who have lost loved ones in
over 40 air disasters. Many of our members have paid the ultimate
price for the lack of safety on the Boeing 737, and we do not consider
the fatalities on USAir 427 and United 585 to be an acceptable margin
of error.
We
are asking the Safety Board to release and endorse a probable cause
for these 737 crashes, and publish the full 500-page 737 report, so
that the safety recommendations can move forward.
Documents
show that the Boeing 737 has had rudder anomalies for 30 years.
(Specifics available upon request).
November
10, 1992, a Safety Board letter states:
· "Analysis by Boeing and Parker Hannifin shows that the
potential for rudder reversal could exist in all B-737 main rudder
PCU's."
· "Boeing and Parker Hannifin are currently developing design
changes to the dual servo valve that would limit the travel of the
secondary slide to eliminate the potential for pressure and returning
port reversal…Boeing is planning a retrofit program."
· "…the Safety Board believes that rudder malfunctions, as
described in this letter, could present significant flight control
difficulties…"
It
has been 8 years since United flight 585, isn't 8 years long enough to
fix this fatal flaw?
Enough
is enough, it is long overdue for the FAA to fully cooperate with the
NTSB and use all of their government powers to make certain that the
airlines implement all Boeing-737 Airworthiness Directives (AD's), and
Safety Board fatal air crash recommendations. The 737 limiter AD was
approved two years ago and the installation work has not begun. The
money and the technology are there--the years of delay must end. The
FAA needs to tell the industry to accept that there is a problem, and
accept their corporate responsibility for the 737 fatal design flaw,
and promptly move forward so that people can fly the safest plane
possible.
For
additional information please contact Gail Dunham at 215-793-0553.
March
3, 1999 - United 585 8th Memorial - Public Comments
MARCH
3, 1999 - UNITED 585 - 8TH ANNIVERSARY
PUBLIC COMMENTS OF GAIL A. DUNHAM -
Eight
years ago today at 9:43 AM United flight 585, a Boeing 737-200, was
approaching Colorado Springs to land when it flipped upside down and
went into the ground like a rocket. Within seven seconds 25 wonderful
people were gone.
Eight
years later the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has failed
to publish a mechanical "probable cause" for UA585, and
eight years later the 737 still has rudder problems. For eight years
the industry has investigated itself, and enough is enough, the Safety
Board owes the American people and us a full report of why there were
25 deaths in Colorado Springs in 1991. We want to see a full report
explaining why UA585 crashed and we are asking the NTSB to issue a
long overdue "probable cause" for the 737 crashes in
Colorado Springs and Pittsburgh."
The
Safety Board should promptly release all information including the
400-page 737 report that has been in draft form for years. Publish
the findings now, so that scientists and professionals from
"outside" the industry can analyze all the UA585 data,
speculation, tests, and internal memos between the industry and
government.
We
are asking the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to direct the
airlines to complete the following 737 consolidated Airworthiness
Directives that were announced January 1997:
· Re-design of the 737-servo valve on or before the required
completion date of August 1999. The NTSB reported December 1992, that
the design phase of the 737-servo valve retrofit had been completed.
The years of delays should not continue. If the industry still doubts
their own recommendations after 8 years, than it is even more
important to release the 400 page 737 report.
· Completion of the 737 limiter before August 2000. This AD was
announced over two years ago and the installation work has not begun.
The
FAA only implements 82.5% of the NTSB fatal air crash safety
recommendations, and there are 43 items in "Open Unacceptable
Response" status.
We
support the Safety Board request since 1991 that the FAA mandate
upgraded flight data recorders in all 737's. The FAA should
issue a new Final Ruling Requiring Increased Parameters for Flight
Data Recorders on 737's effective on or before December 31, 1999.
Upgraded recorders must be installed before 2002. Passengers should
not be forced to wait ten years for safety equipment that only costs
$3,000 to $5,000 per aircraft by FAA estimates.
In
the U.S. we have not had a 737 catastrophic accident since Pittsburgh,
September 1994, however, the 737 rudder problems at a low altitude
could produce another UA585 or USAir 427. Recently the 117 passengers
on USAir Metrojet were lucky and walked away from their emergency
landing. Our loved ones were not so lucky.
Disclosure
of the following would re-assure the Families of UA585 that everything
is being done to determine a cause of the UA585 crash:
· Publicly ask NTSB and independent investigators: "What is the
probable cause of UA585?"
· Explain the disappearance of the servo valve, spring and cap for so
many years.
· Disclose the "737 In Service Activity Reports" dated May
8, 1986. This 12-year-old report lists prior 737 incidents of reported
rudder anomalies. Additional "In Service Activity Reports"
should be disclosed which are reported to include 40-60 rudder anomaly
reports per year.
· Disclosure of the records of the 737 "Expert Panel" which
convened from March 1996, to January 1997.
· Disclosure of Safety Board Member John Lauber's flights on the
United 737 simulator just after the UA585 crash, which are reported to
conclude that a rudder hardover was possible.
· Explain the NTSB "Letter of Reprimand" sent to United
Airlines August 4, 1992, for conducting private tests on an errant 737
rudder for almost three weeks during July 1992; and take action
against those who operated secretly outside of the federal
investigation, while a party to the investigation.
· Show us the internal contamination from the power control unit from
UA585.
The
Public Docket may contain 18,000 pages of data; however, the
"Letter of Reprimand to United Airlines," and the November,
1992 NTSB letter could not be found when I requested them. We
ask that everything pertinent to 737's be made part of the Public
Docket.
The
Safety Board has scheduled a meeting on March 23, 1999, to discuss the
400-page 737 report, with plans to release the report in April 1999.
Considering the recent rudder anomaly on a USAir Metrojet 737, and
years of un-explained 737 rudder problems, we believe this major
report should be public record as soon as possible. It is time for
everyone to have equal access to all of the information.
Brief
History of United 585
UA585
had no Public Hearing and there are so many questions about the
"investigation." Safety Board policy is for a go team to be
dispatched to the accident site within 2-3 hours. The accident was at
9:43 AM, but the "team" left Washington DC later that day
and the first meeting did not happen until 10 PM Sunday night. From
Day 1 actions reflected a lack of concern about UA585. The UA585
"full go-team" did not seem to be a coherent force. John
Lauber, NTSB Board Member did not stay on site, and in less than 24
hours nothing was shared with the media. Al Dickinson was
Investigator-in-Charge (ICC), but we do not know if he was on the
go-team flight, or how long he stayed on site. Whenever I called Al
Dickinson about a report on UA585 he was always working on something
else. Joel Ryan was the original specialist for systems, but he was
eventually removed from the UA585 investigation. Greg Phillips
presented the systems report, but had not chaired that committee for
the first year of the investigation. The specialists for powerplants
and other groups gave no reports at the meeting December 1992. Others
who read prepared speeches had not been on site and seemed to have
little or no involvement with the investigation.
I
have assembled a list of the UA585 meetings that were reported. There
were 90 investigators and only 18 were from the NTSB. Meetings were
primarily held at and supervised by United, Parker Hannifin, and
Boeing facilities. They even had meetings at Parker Hannifin before PH
was party to the investigation! I believe that when the NTSB gave the
UA585 power control unit (PCU) to the industry, the NTSB also gave
away the investigation of UA585. The Safety Board needs to be given
the resources to have more control of these investigations so that
evidence of product defect is not given to the aviation
industry-rather the Safety Board should be in control of vital
evidence collected in a federal investigation.
For
UA585 the first group-planning meeting was March 25, 1991, three weeks
after the crash. During the April 25, 1991, progress meeting they said
they had, "a lack of understanding of the accident." The
second full team meeting did not occur until February 1992, eleven
months after the crash. The wreckage was not examined until 13 months
after the crash. A computer was brought in to chase wind theories. It
produced 12-18 months of additional delays because of
"interfacing" problems.
In
December 1992, Greg Phillips announced that Boeing had completed the
design phase of the 737 retrofit. However, no leadership moved forward
on the retrofits that could have prevented the Pittsburgh crash.
The
Final Report of UA585 (released December 1992) reflects a search for
"wind theories" rather than the probable cause of a rudder
design defect. After USAir 427, the Pittsburgh 737-300 crash September
8, 1994, the NTSB began looking at rudder anomalies unique to 737's.
Perhaps the most important scientific investigation of UA585 has been
done in recent years; and after 8 long years we want the information
released.
Letter
of November 10, 1992
Last
year a letter from November 1992 was finally released that clearly
states, "Analysis by Boeing and Parker Hannifin shows the
potential for rudder reversal could exist in all 737 main rudder
PCU's." The letter also documents five other known
incidents of 737 rudder anomalies, one as early as July 24, 1974. The
letter reads like a Memo of Understanding that Boeing and Parker
Hannifin were actively working to correct the design flaw to eliminate
the potential for reversal, which may have killed 25 people in
Colorado Springs in 1991. Unfortunately, the work was not done that
could have prevented the Pittsburgh crash, and eight years after UA585
the possibility still exists.
