

THREE PAGES 9/11
FAA Terrorist Warning



US Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

Civil Aviation Security

Security Directive

Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should Be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to Air Carriers

Number: SD 108-98-05

Date: December 8, 1998

EXPIRATION: January 31, 1999

Security Directive (SD) 108-98-05 must be implemented immediately upon receipt.

AVSEC ALERT LEVEL: AVSEC Alert Level III remains in effect.

INFORMATION:

We have received information that unidentified individuals, who are associated with a terrorist organization, may be planning a hijacking from a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States. We believe the threat is current.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UNDER 14 CFR PART 108:

1. In addition to the measures required by this SD, all measures required under other SD's or under the air carrier standard security program (ACSSP) remain in effect. Other SD series applicable to the air carrier operations affected by SD 108-98-05 are: SD 95-02 series; SD 96-03 series; SD 97-01 series; and the SD 108-98-01 series.
 2. The measures outlined in this SD shall be applied to each scheduled and public charter flight or flight segment departing from the following airports:
 - John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)
 - La Guardia Airport (LGA)
 - Newark International Airport (EWR)
- I. Within 48 hours after receiving this SD, the air carrier must submit to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) for approval, a plan to increase air carrier oversight that addresses proper screening and clearance procedures at screening checkpoints. At multiple-use checkpoints, a cooperative plan for increasing presence at the checkpoints may be developed jointly by air carriers using that checkpoint. Plans should address increasing the presence of Ground Security Coordinators (GSC's), increasing the use of Checkpoint Security Supervisors (CSS's), and other actions to improve oversight of checkpoint operations.
 - II. Recent surveillance of procedures used to screen passengers and their carry-on items has revealed that particular attention to the following areas is required.
 - A. Metal detector alarms. Screeners must not assume that the cause of the alarm is common clothing items such as the belt buckle, metal buttons on clothing, and metal in shoes. The screeners must determine that there isn't another item (a weapon) causing the alarm.

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B. Screening persons in wheelchairs and the wheelchair itself.

[Redacted]

The guidelines for screening of handicapped persons, as outlined in the checkpoint operations guide (COG), should be closely followed.

C. Manual searches of carry-on items. Screeners must not assume the source of the suspect object, and must continue searching all other articles in the carry-on item.

D. Clearance procedures using an explosive trace detector (ETD) device for suspect items identified by the x-ray operator (see section I. of the SD 97-01 series). Suspect items must be individually cleared with the ETD device using the procedures outlined in the FAA-approved amendment. All other articles in the carry-on item must be manually searched (see sections C.1.b. and C.1.b.1. of the FAA-approved ETD device amendment).

III.

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IV. A GSC must oversee the inspection of a sterile area each time it is put into operation following a period of non-control. The inspection must ensure that the sterile area is clear of unauthorized persons, explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous items (see ACSSP section IV.B.2.).

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VI. The following measures supersede the checkpoint staffing standards outlined in ACSSP section II. Screeners must only perform the duties of the specific screening position they are assigned to.

- A. X-ray operators must only interpret images on the monitor, and must refer suspect items to another screener for additional screening.
- B. Persons performing manual searches of carry-on items must only perform those searches.
- C. Persons monitoring the walk-through metal detector must only perform that duty.
- D. Persons performing hand-held metal detector screening or pat down searches of persons must only perform that duty.
- E. ETD device operators must only be assigned to conduct screening of carry-on items, and associated clearance procedures (manual searches) of carry-on items screened, using an ETD device.

VII. The following measures apply to each air carrier who has an established exclusive area agreement with the airport operator.

A. Review and test contingency and emergency communications procedures to ensure that those systems are operational.


B.

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VIII. Air carriers shall advise direct air carrier employees and representatives contracted by the air carrier, that security procedures must be applied in a courteous and non-discriminatory manner. The advisory must emphasize that it is impermissible to apply any procedures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or gender characteristics, or national origin of US citizens.

AIR CARRIER ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Within 24 hours of receipt of this SD, the air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, acknowledging receipt.

AIR CARRIER DISSEMINATION REQUIRED: The air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information in this SD, to ensure full implementation by the effective time and date.

The air carriers shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at JFK, LGA, and EWR only. US air carrier local station security personnel should coordinate the information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know.

The air carriers must brief all air carrier personnel performing security duties to implement this SD on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination. No other dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. Unauthorized dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 14 CFR 108.18 and 191.5.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, according to 14 CFR 108.18(c), air carriers may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations.

FOR FAA ACTION ONLY: The FAA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security element of all affected US air carriers operating at JFK, LGA, and EWR only.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post must refer to STATE 093752, 300308Z Mar 93, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

/s/

Cathal L. Flynn
Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security

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Security Directive

Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to U.S. Air Carriers
Number: SD 108-00-03B

Date: July 27, 2001

EXPIRATION: January 31, 2002

Security Directive (SD) 108-00-03B, which shall be implemented immediately upon receipt, extends for an additional six months the security measures and actions required under SD 108-00-03A, dated February 15, 2001, which it supercedes. Substantive changes from SD 108-00-03A are indicated by bold text.

INFORMATION: FAA is not aware of any information that moderates the credibility of the threat identified in SD 108-00-03 and, therefore, republishes the threat information in its entirety, as follows:

Information has been received that a mentally distraught Egyptian national has made threats to blow up an aircraft and/or harm U.S. officials. The threat to blow up an aircraft may involve the individual carrying explosives aboard an airliner. The threat to harm U.S. officials may involve the mailing of a package, parcel, or letter to the United States.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS:

- I. Measures outlined in this SD shall be immediately implemented by all U.S. air carriers operating from Cairo, Egypt, to the United States, its territories and Commonwealths.
- II. Should an individual matching the name and description and/or carrying a passport noted in Section III present himself for transport, the air carrier shall:
 - A. Not transport that individual or his baggage [REDACTED]
 - B. Immediately notify appropriate local law enforcement authorities and provide them with the information in this directive.
 - C. Immediately notify all U.S. air carriers at that airport.
 - D. Immediately notify the FAA 24-hour watch at (202) 267-3099.
- III. The following individual is considered to be dangerous:
 - A. [name] [name]

Also:

- [name] [name] [name] [name]

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Ex. 28
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Date and Place of Birth (DPOB): [REDACTED]
Hair: [REDACTED]
Eyes: [REDACTED]
Height: [REDACTED]
Weight: [REDACTED]
Nationality: Egyptian
Passport: [REDACTED]

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IV. The air carrier shall strictly enforce the cargo acceptance procedures required by the ACSSP Section XV.A.8.

AIR CARRIER ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that they have received it.

AIR CARRIER DISSEMINATION REQUIRED: The air carrier shall provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information in this SD.

The air carriers shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at foreign locations only. U.S. air carrier local station security personnel should coordinate the information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All air carrier personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the air carrier on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination.

APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: In accordance with ACSSP Section XV.A.2., the air carrier shall immediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by the carrier or its agents, or is not being carried out by a foreign government authority charged with performing security procedures.

FOR FAA ACTION ONLY: The FAA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. air carriers.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post must refer to STATE 174137, 212201Z Aug 96, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

//S//

Michael A. Canavan
Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security

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Security Directive
Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed

Subject: Threat to Air Carriers

Number: SD-96-05

Date: August 19, 1996

EXPIRATION: January 25, 1997

FAA COMMENTS: Air Carriers will continue to be at AVSEC Alert Level III. This Security Directive (SD) provides information regarding U.S. judicial proceedings, the threat to U.S. air carriers following the crash of TWA flight 800, new information regarding the conviction and planned sentencing of terrorist involved in the hijacking of an EgyptAir airliner in 1985, and:

- cancels SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D,
- consolidates information that was contained in SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D,
- combines SD-95-11K and SD-96-02D profiles into one closely following SD-96-02D,
- [REDACTED]
- continues the SD-96-02D revocation of off-airport and curbside check-in amendments for all flights specified in Section II of this SD.
- provides three attachments: [REDACTED]

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INFORMATION:

Anti-U.S. sentiment has been evident during 1996 in response to U.S. judicial proceedings. These judicial proceedings involve individuals with known or alleged ties to transnational terrorist organizations and could prompt violent acts against U.S. interests by terrorist organizations or persons affiliated with or sympathetic to individuals on trial or already sentenced.

The January 1996 conviction and sentence of Egyptian cleric Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman to life without the possibility of parole or extradition is bitterly resented by his followers. Threats have been made against the United States by these elements, who charge that the United States is unduly attacking their

Security Directive
Page 2 of 10

Islamic leaders and teachings. These sentiments were again echoed by Sheik Rahman at his sentencing. He verbally attacked the United States, President Clinton, the Congress, the Pentagon and the court, calling them "infidels," and characterized the United States as Islam's greatest enemy.

The investigation into the crash of TWA flight 800 is ongoing. It should be noted that there is no information linking any of the aforementioned events with the TWA crash. The cause of the TWA crash has not been determined, and it is difficult to ascertain when investigators will be able to make a determination as to the cause.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY U.S. CARRIERS:

- L The following measures shall be applied to all flights (regardless of destination) departing locations within the United States and its territories/commonwealths:
 - A. The following profile shall be conducted at the initial point where the passenger checks in. (see Attachment 1)
 - 1. A passenger [except for those identified in NOTE 1, below] becomes a selectee if



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